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 
Abstract— Network Use-of-System (UoS) tariffs play an essential 
role in the deregulated power markets to recover network 
investment and maintenance costs from network users, and send 
economic signals to influence the users’ behaviours in using 
systems. The tariffs are essential to the business operation of both 
network operators and users. They, however, could have great 
volatility due to the uncertainties from both external and internal 
factors. Such uncertain tariffs could bring severe adverse impacts 
to network users, which justifies that there is an urgent need to 
reduce the tariff volatility and improve its predictability. 
This paper for the first time investigates the variations in 
network tariffs that cause great risks to network users and then 
designs financial tools to reduce the volatility. The causing factors 
of the variations are categorised into global and local groups 
according to their different features. After introducing the 
process from network planning, charging to revenue 
reconciliation, the paper discusses the benefits of hedging for 
network users. In order to reduce tariff volatility, it proposes a 
novel risk management strategy to maintain the consistency of 
tariffs. It is achieved by designing long-term contracts using 
financial hedging. The value of hedge contracts is decided by 
three key factors: hedged load/generation percentage, hedged 
price, and risk premium. The hedged part is charged at hedged 
prices and the non-hedged part is charged at actual prices, on top 
of which customers needs to pay extra for the risk premium. The 
paper also designs an optimal decision-making tool to assist 
network users to manage long-term contracts in order to reduce 
total tariff costs. As demonstrated in the case study, the proposed 
long-term products can effectively reduce tariff volatility for 
network users and create a safe environment for their business 
operation.  
 
Index Terms-- Network pricing, risk management, uncertainty, 
long-term contract, fixed adder, revenue reconciliation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
N deregulated environment, generation and demand need 
to pay for their use of transmission and distribution 
networks, which comes into the form of use-of-system tariffs 
collected by network operators [1, 2]. Network tariffs are 
economic media that closely link network operators and users 
apart from the physical infrastructure. The tariffs serve two 
major purposes: i) to recover network investment, operation, 
and maintenance costs from network users; and ii) to influence 
network users’ decisions in connection sizes and locations for 
minimum network investment [3-8]. Network tariffs are not 
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only important to network operators but also to customers as 
the tariffs take up a large proportion of their capital costs. In 
the UK, network tariffs account for around 21% of the total 
electricity bills for a typical domestic customer [9]. 
Network tariffs are calculated according to the investment 
in networks and their utilisation by network users. In the 
deregulated environment, network planning is conducted in a 
decoupled manner in order to accommodate the increasing 
generation and demand. Particularly, to meet carbon reduction 
targets, a large volume of low carbon technologies will be 
connected to existing power networks, such as wind power, 
solar generation, electric vehicles, heat pumps and energy 
storage devices. These new low carbon technologies will bring 
great uncertainties to network planning due to their 
intermittency/unbounded increase. The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that the individual behaviour change 
of some users can affect network utilisation and consequently 
network planning and tariffs for other users. Therefore, in 
reality, it is very hard to precisely predict network investment 
costs. The adverse impact is the volatility of network tariffs, 
defined as tariff risk, which is inevitable for demand and 
generation and can threaten their business operation.  
 In practice, it would be extremely beneficial for both 
network operators and users if the variation in network tariffs 
could be reduced to some extent or their patterns could be 
predicted with acceptable accuracy. The reasons are that: i) 
network operators have to obey the mandatory regulations set 
by regulators to produce cost-reflective and transparent tariffs, 
and ii) network users are vulnerable to tariff fluctuation and 
prefer a relatively safe financial environment. The watchdog 
of the UK’s electricity and gas markets - the Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets (Ofgem) requires that distribution network 
operators (DNOs) should look at developing methods to 
address the volatility of distribution tariffs [10, 11]. In one of 
its official documents on network tariffs, Ofgem states that 
DNOs are required to develop long-term charging products in 
order to address any concerns consumers may have with 
annual volatility of distribution tariffs, particularly at Extra-
high Voltage (EHV) distribution level, and DNOs are required 
to develop tools to help customers understand and model their 
future tariffs [10]. In a survey conducted by the Energy 
Network Associate (ENA) in the UK, the industry 
stakeholders have expressed a high interest in developing 
mechanisms to enable distribution tariffs to be fixed or more 
stable and transparent [12]. Although it is impossible to 
accurately predict network tariffs, it is possible to reduce and 
mitigate their volatility, i.e. risk, by financial tools. 
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Risk is the potential loss or an undesired outcome caused 
by the choice of a chosen action or the choice of inaction. Risk 
assessment in power systems is not new and can be generally 
categorized into two areas: technical risk analysis and 
economic risk analysis [13]. The former focuses on the 
technical risk assessment in power systems, while financial 
risk management refers to the process of analysing risk 
exposure and attempting to minimise the risk though financial 
means, including diversification, hedging, leverage etc. Lots 
of research efforts have been put into risk management in 
energy market [14, 15], but there is no research conducted in 
risk management for network tariffs, despite that the industry 
is very keen to understanding the possibility, benefits and 
challenges in risk management for network tariffs. The work 
proposed here is to fill the gap by designing long-term 
products to reduce network users’ exposure to tariff risk.  
This paper is directed to understand the causes for the 
uncertainties in network tariffs and design long-term products 
to reduce the tariff volatility for network users. It investigates 
the causes by examining the process from network planning to 
charge calculation and revenue recovery. It thereby proposes 
long-term contracts to reduce the risk network users’ are 
exposed to by fixing their network tariffs for a chosen period 
of time using financial hedging. The values of the contracts 
are decided by three factors: contract length, hedged load 
percentage and risk premium. In each contract, network users 
need to pay for the base tariffs plus an extra amount for the 
risk premium. The long-term contracts can effectively reduce 
the variations in network tariffs and create a relatively safe 
environment for network users. This paper also examines the 
scenario that if network operators provide a group of hedge 
contracts how network users manage them. An optimisation 
based decision-making tool is introduced to help network 
users to manage long-term contracts in order to mitigate risk 
and minimise total costs.  
The key contributions of the paper are: i) it investigates the 
factors affecting UoS tariffs by examining network planning, 
charge calculation and revenue reconciliation; ii) it for the first 
time proposes long-term contracts to reduce the risk in 
network users’ UoS tariffs; iii) further it designs an 
optimisation-based decision-making tool to assist network 
users to manage long-term contracts for minimum tariffs.  
The rest of this paper is organised as: Section II introduces 
the factors causing volatility in network tariffs. In Section III, 
hedging and its benefits in the practical application are 
introduced. Section IV designs long-term contracts and 
Section V develops an optimal contract management tool for 
network users. Section VI provides a case study to 
demonstrate the value of proposed methodologies. Section VII 
provides a discussion and section VIII concludes this paper. 
II.  VOLATILITY IN NETWORK TARIFFS  
A.  Network Planning, Charging and Revenue recovery 
In deregulated environment, the generation, transport and 
consumption of electricity is conducted in a decoupled manner.  
Network operators are responsible for network planning, 
operation, and maintenance and their activities are regulated 
by the regulators. Generation and demand use networks to 
transport the electricity and pay network operators for the use. 
Network users’ right to use networks and the liable costs are 
protected by regulators to ensure fairness. To this end, 
network charging methodologies are utilised to calculate the 
costs that users need to pay for their use of networks, which 
come in the form of network charges.  
Currently in the UK, DNOs use two levels of charging 
methodologies to derive network charges: Common 
Distribution Charging Methodology (CDCM) used for LV and 
HV customers ( the connecting network voltage level equals to 
or below 11 kV) and Extra-high Voltage (EHV) Distribution 
Charging Methodology (EDCM) methodology (the connecting 
network voltage is higher than 11kV). CDCM is largely 
referred to Distribution Reinforcement Model (DRM) [16]. By 
contrast, EDCM consists of two common methodologies - 
Long-run Incremental Cost (LRIC) Pricing and Forward Cost 
Pricing (FCP). For EDCM customers, as required by Ofgem, 
DNOs can choose either of the two methods to implement in 
practice. LRIC pricing evaluates the investment costs 
necessary to accommodate new generation and demand in a 
network and appropriately assigns the cost to network users in 
an incremental way [1, 7]. By contrast, FCP pricing is an 
average pricing model. It evaluates the total network 
investment costs over next 10 years and allocates the costs 
evenly to all existing and forecasted demand and generation 
customers in the same zone. The aim is that the total revenue 
recovered over the 10 years period equals to the forecasted 
reinforcement costs over the same period [16]. The detailed 
theory and implementation procedures for the two 
methodologies can be found in the following papers and 
publications: LRIC [1, 17-19] and FCP [16, 20-22]. 
 The total allowed costs that network operators can recover 
from EDCM and CDCM network users is called revenue 
recovery. The revenue is proportionally split between the two 
groups of customers based on the investment and maintenance 
costs of on-ground network assets at each voltage level and 
customer sizes. EDCM customers are only liable for EDCM 
charges, while CDCM customers are liable for both EDCM 
and CDCM charges. Usually, the total recovery based on 
charging models results in either a shortfall or a surplus. In 
this case, the charges need to be scaled up or down to mitigate 
the imbalance, which is termed as revenue reconciliation. 
There are two commonly adopted revenue reconciliation 
approaches- "fixed adder" and "fixed multiplier" [20, 23]. The 
fixed adder method adds/subtracts a constant amount to/from 
all nodal charges to make up for the revenue shortfall/surplus. 
The multiplier method scales all nodal charges by a constant 
factor - the ratio of the allowed revenue to the recovered 
revenue. The recent progress in improving scaling approaches 
targets at amending fixed adder to incorporate more planning 
concerns to properly allocate the unrecovered revenue. The 
examined approaches by DNOs are traditional fixed adder, 
voltage level adder and site specific adder [24]. In this paper, 
only site specific adder is used for scaling up/down charges. 
This scaling approach allocates the unrecovered revenue based 
on the level of assets used by each demand customers. Instead 
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of assuming the average use of assets at each network level by 
each customer, it utilizes a “network use factor” for each 
customer to measure their use of system [20]. The network use 
factor of each component for a particular customer can be 
obtained through power flow analysis [21]. The methodology 
for calculating site specific adders and demonstration 
examples can be found in [21, 24].  
The unit tariffs are the summation of network charges and 
adders (decided by revenue ports). Increasing network 
utilization produce bigger network charges and increasing 
revenue ports generate larger site specific adders. When 
revenue ports are fixed or become smaller, increasing network 
utilisation leads to decreasing site specific adders. 
B.  Network Tariff Volatility  
The volatility in network tariffs means that year-on-year 
tariffs change dramatically, which is mainly caused by the 
uncertainties and variations of the inputs into network 
charging methodologies.  These uncertainties are very hard to 
predict and could have great impacts on network tariffs. 
According to their different features, the uncertainties can be 
roughly divided into global and local groups. 
i) Uncertainties in global group include national and regional 
economic growth, which have direct influence on 
electricity generation and consumption, and environmental 
regulations and legislations that impact operators’ 
investment, etc. These uncertainties are beyond their 
control but have to be considered in network planning. For 
example, in order to support governments’ ambition in 
reducing CO2 emission,  network operators have to ensure 
sufficient network capacity to accommodate intermittent 
renewable generation and low carbon demand which are  
hard to be precisely predicted; 
ii) Uncertainties in local group are defined as the factors 
which are mapped into charging models and have direct 
impacts on network tariff calculations, such as customer 
coincidence factors for DRM, discount factor for LRIC 
and FCP, network utilisation level. One predominate 
example here is that the behaviour change of one customer 
can affect the network tariffs other users need to pay. It is 
because the allowed revenue recovery is divided among 
network users according to their sizes and locations, and 
therefore their behaviours will directly change network 
utilisation and the split of revenue, and consequently the 
tariffs they and other customers pay.  
These uncertainties cause network tariffs to vary to some 
extent over time and be hard to predict. Such volatility could 
have detrimental impacts to network users and therefore there 
is an urgent necessity to devise technical and economic 
strategies to mitigate it.  
III.  HEDGING AND ITS BENEFITS FOR NETWORK USERS 
A.  Hedging 
Excessive volatility in assets’ prices or use of assets’ 
charges may make companies’ investment strategies severely 
distorted by the uncertainties. In this risky environment, the 
companies’ expected rate of return can be highly volatile, 
which could lead to bankruptcy. For users, they have to face 
greater variations in their costs [25]. The literatures on risk 
management argue that hedging, acting as a financial risk 
management technique, can offset the potential losses caused 
by the volatility [26]. Hedging has been widely studied and 
successfully applied into energy markets [27]. It can be 
constructed from many types of financial instruments, 
including insurance, forward contracts, swaps, options, many 
types of derivative products, and perhaps most popular future 
contracts. The degree of hedging on the forward contracts 
depends on the hedge contract types and used financial 
instruments. An appropriate strategy of hedging can produce 
optimal capital investment outcomes [25, 27].  
The standard way to price a forward contract is to find the 
conditional risk-neutral expected value of the future delivery 
from the contract [28]. The taker of a forward hedge contract 
is penalised by an extra payment which is called risk premium. 
It is priced by the difference between the risk free value and 
the risk-neutral expected value of the future delivery of the 
forward contract. One of the peculiarities of commodities 
markets is that the market price of risk may be either positive 
or negative, depending on the time horizon considered [28]. 
B.  Benefits of Long-term Hedge Products  
The reason behind creating long-term hedging products is 
to give network users - suppliers, large generation and demand, 
whoever have pass-through UoS arrangements, the option to 
reduce volatility in year-on-year network tariffs. This will aid 
their business operation by reducing capital risk and 
increasing cost transparency. In a survey conducted by ENA, 
suppliers and generation largely stated that long-term contracts 
would reduce volatility within the distribution UoS market 
[12]. Some developed this by suggesting that such reduction in 
volatility would enable suppliers to reduce risk premiums 
added to their charges for end-use domestic and commercial 
customers. Energy suppliers will benefit as greater stability in 
UoS tariffs that reduce the risk to their business will enable 
them to offer cheaper products to their customers. Generators, 
particularly renewable generators who have great degree of 
intermittency, are also supportive of the products and suggest 
that it would assist them with current and future investment.  
IV.  LONG-TERM HEDGE CONTRACT DESIGN  
In this paper, hedging of distribution network UoS tariffs is 
achieved through long-term contracts, which fix network 
tariffs for a certain proportion of demand/generation at a 
predefined price for a chosen period. The procedures of 
designing the contracts consist of tariff prediction, risk 
premium calculation, and hedge contract value calculation.  
A.  UoS Tariff Projection 
In the first step, UoS tariffs are projected for the next 
regulatory period normally five years in the UK, assuming no 
unanticipated changes in the systems except projected demand 
and generation growth, network expansion and upgrades. The 
information for the prediction is from network operators’ 
Long-term Development Statements (LTDSs) [29]. The 
projected tariffs are used as benchmark of hedge contract 
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values. The prediction consists of the following procedures. 
i) Collect base year network information, including 
demand, generation and their growth plus commercial 
data of network costs data and discount rate; 
ii) Feed the information into network charging models- 
LRIC, FCP and DRM - to calculate unit network 
charges for all studied nodes; 
iii) Calculate revenue recovery from the calculated 
network charges; 
iv) Calculate the allowed revenue recovery and split it into 
CDCM port and EDCM port; 
v) Conduct revenue reconciliation if there is any shortfall 
or surplus in the revenue recovery via site specific 
adder to scale up/down unit tariffs. 
B.  Risk Premium 
In designing long-term contracts, risk premium is 
introduced to reflect customer’s aversion to risk. Risk 
premium has been commonly used in economic risk analysis. 
A risk premium is the minimum amount of money by which 
the expected return on a risky asset must exceed the known 
return on a risk-free asset, or the expected return on a less 
risky asset, in order to induce an individual to hold the risky 
asset rather than the risk-free asset [30]. In this work, risk 
premium indicates that network users are willing to pay more 
in order that the uncertainties in their tariffs can be reduced. 
The risk is transferred to network operators [31] and therefore 
they charge more for bearing the risk.  
The magnitude of risk premium depends on the proportion 
of hedged load/generation percentage, hedged price, and 
contract length. Once the information and projected tariffs are 
settled, risk premium can be calculated with (1), which is 
similar to that used in energy market [31] 
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where, Dt is customer’s demand/generation size, T refers to 
hedge contract length, t is year index, r is hedged 
load/generation percentage, P0 is hedged unit price, Pt is  
predicted unit tariff, and d is discount rate. 
The numerator term in the risk premium in (1) produces the 
charge difference between the cases with and without hedging 
in the contract. The denominator term produces the total 
charges, where the hedged part is charged at a fixed hedge 
price P0, and the other part is charged at the actual yearly 
varying price Pt. The whole equation generates a percentage, 
reflecting the potential gain/lose for DNOs to bear the risk 
caused by fixing network users’ UoS tariffs.  
In this paper, Dt is the predicted customer’s size in Year t. 
It is determined by a given projected load growth rate against 
the load size in the initial year. Pt is the predicted unit tariff in 
Year t corresponding to Dt. Pt can be calculated by either UoS 
charging methodology- LRIC or FCP, based on the predicted 
Dt and network information. In this paper Pt is generated by 
LRIC methodology. Both Dt and Pt are predicated and 
determined by DNOs, who have the needed information and 
knowledge for calculating charges. P0 is the hedged unit price 
for network users. It should be determined by DNOs 
themselves based on their financial risk and profit analysis, 
considering both their risk bearing capabilities and profit 
expectations. This paper does not investigate the 
determination of P0 as it is out of its scope and therefore it 
uses assumed values for demonstration purposes.  
C.  Value of Long-term Contracts 
When network users choose to sign up with long-term 
contracts, they will see less tariff variations. They can benefit 
by knowing part of their network tariff costs in advance and 
because of this privilege, they need to pay extra [32]. The final 
tariffs that a customer pays include three parts: i) the non-
hedged load/generation is charged at the actual unit tariff of 
each year; ii) hedged load/generation is charged at the hedged 
unit price; and iii) on tops of the two parts, an extra portion 
needs to be paid for the risk reduction. The final UoS tariffs 
take the form of  
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where, the variables in (2) are the same as those in (1).   
D.  Implementation of Long-term Contracts 
Long-term contracts are applicable to both CDCM and 
EDCM customers as long as they are willing to sign up.  By 
summarizing the foregoing procedures, the proposed contracts 
can be implemented by operators through the following steps.  
i) Step 1: project network tariffs based on collected 
network and commercial information;  
ii) Step 2: provide a group of hedged load/generation 
percentage and the corresponding hedged prices;  
iii) Step 3: calculate risk premium under each combination 
of hedged load/generation percentage and price;  
iv) Step 4: calculate values of long-term hedge contracts. 
V.  OPTIMAL HEDGE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT  
It is anticipated that in order to reduce administration 
burden and increase the simplicity of long-term contracts, 
network operators might only be willing to provide a group of 
hedge contracts for customers to choose. These contracts 
differ in: i) hedged load/generation percentage, ii) hedged unit 
price, and iii) contract length. Under this circumstance, 
customers are entitled to choose their preferable hedge 
contracts with different combinations of the three parameters 
according to their degree of aversion to risk. Because of the 
interconnection of the three parameters, customers have to 
understand their impact on contract values and eventually 
reach to an optimal combination of them for minimum tariffs. 
Decision-making tools are therefore needed for assisting 
network customers to choose optimal contracts. 
This decision-making in choosing hedge contracts can be 
modelled as an optimisation problem, whose objective is to 
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minimise the overall tariffs over a given period. This 
optimisation problem is to find the right hedged 
load/generation percentage within each contract to reach the 
minimum tariffs. The problem is subject to the constraints of 
hedged load/generation percentage, as modelled in (3)  
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where, the variables in (3) are the same as those in (2).  
By substituting (1) into (3), the optimisation problem can 
be converted into the following form 
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Given that P0, Pt, and Dt are already known, the function 
curve of V(r) is either convex or concave depending on r. It 
has only one extreme value points either minimum when it is 
convex or maximum when it is concave. Thus, the minimum 
value of V(r) can be calculated by solving equation V’(r) =0, 
where V’(r) is the derivative of V(r) with respect to r.  
In reality, network operators might only provide a couple of 
contracts with discrete hedged load/generation percentages. 
Under such circumstance, the discrete optimal percentages can 
be found around the continual optimal values. The discrete 
optimal value must be one of the two discrete values closest to 
the continual optimal value. The condition for reaching the 
minimum is that on the left side of the continual optimal point, 
V(r) decreases with r monotonically, while on the right side 
V(r) increases with r monotonically.   
VI.  CASE STUDY 
To demonstrate the proposed methodologies, this paper 
focuses on analysing the scenarios in which the volatility in 
network tariffs is caused by uncertain network investment due 
to the behaviour change of network users. For demonstration 
purposes, it only examines tariff risks for certain demand 
customers caused by other customers’ disconnection and 
connection.  
The proposed tariff hedging is demonstrated on the system 
given in Figure 1. D1 and D2 are EDCM customers with the 
sizes of 5MW and 10MW respectively. There is 40MW 
aggregated CDCM customers at busbar 2. The demonstration 
mainly focuses on tariff analysis for D1 and D2. For the 
purposes of simplicity, the three circuits are assumed to have 
the same capacity of 40MVA, but their investment costs vary:  
£577,138 for L1, and £288,569 for both L2 and L3. A 
generally used load growth rate of 1% and discount rate of 
6.9% in the UK are applied to this example. The projected 
demand at busbars D1 and D2 in the next 5 years based on 1% 
growth rate are given in Table I. 
 
Bus1
L2 L3
CDCM
40MW
D2
Bus3
L1
D1
5 MW 10 MW
Bus2
N/O
 
Fig 1 Three-busbar test system 
 
TABLE I PROJECTED MW DEMAND OVER 5 YEARS (MW) 
Dt Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
D1  5.0 5.05 5.1 5.15 5.2 
D2  10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.41 
 
TABLE II PROJECTED UNIT RESULTS OVER 5 YEARS (£/MW/YR) 
Pt Type Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
D1  
Charge 0.091 0.095 0.1 0.105 0.111 
Adder 2612.85 2564.79 2515.91 2466.16 2415.47 
Tariff 2,612.94 2,564.88 2,516.01 2,466.27 2,415.58 
D2  
Charge 259.95 274.98 290.88 307.70 325.49 
Adder 766.27 752.17 737.84 723.25 708.38 
Tariff 1,026.22 1,027.15 1,028.72 1,030.95 1,033.88 
 
If there are no unexpected changes except natural load 
growth appearing in the system, yearly unit network tariffs for 
busbars 1 and 2 can be predicted by running network charging 
and revenue recovery analysis. The values over 5 years are 
provided in Table II, where site specific fixed adder is used for 
scaling [24]. The summation of first line unit charges plus the 
second line unit adders produces the final unit tariffs.  
For Year 1, network use factors of all three branches are 
calculated by diving annual revenue to be recovered of each 
component (8557.77£/yr, 427.89£/yr, 427.89£/yr) by assumed 
CDCM customer charges (800£/MW/yr), which produces 
10.70, 0.53 and 0.53 respectively. The sum of total network 
user factor is 11.77. The 20% residual of the port is the EDCM 
port (23326.87£/yr) minus revenue recovered (2599.94£/yr) 
times 20%, producing 4145.38 £/yr. This residual is then 
divided by the two EDCM customers’ sizes (15MW in total), 
producing 276.36£/MW/yr. The half of the 80% residual is 
calculated with EDCM port (23326.87£/yr) minus revenue 
recovered (2599.94£/yr) times 80% and divided by 2, 
producing 8290.77£/yr. The site specific adder for Year 1 is 
the summation of two different parts: (8920.77×10.70 
/11.77+920.77/2)/5=2336.49£/MW/yr, and 2) 276.36£/MW/yr. 
The final site specific adder is 2612.85£/MW/yr. The similar 
calculation procedures can be used for other years. 
The unit charges for D1 are relatively small due to that L1 
is fairly lightly loaded (12.5%) and thus a small injection has 
little impact on its investment horizon. Therefore, a large 
proportion of revenue for D1 is recovered by the adders. When 
the three circuits’ utilisation increases, network charges 
become larger and the adders become smaller. It should be 
noted that although D1 and D2’s network charges increase 
over the 5 years, the unit tariffs for D1 decrease gradually but 
increase for D2 increase. It is because that the network charges 
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grow very slowly but adders decrease relatively quick as there 
is more demand on Bus 1 to share the revenue. For D2, the 
network charge increase at nearly 5.8%, which overwhelm the 
decrease in adders caused by increasing demand. Therefore, 
D2 has increasing unit tariffs. The unit tariffs in Table II are 
used as benchmarks for long-term contract design. 
A.  Impact of Hedge Contract  
In this section, three different scenarios are explored to 
demonstrate the impact of hedge contract on UoS tariffs for 
network users. The hedged load percentage and hedged unit 
price are already known and the task is to calculate the risk 
premium and final tariffs. In all three examples, 50% demand 
of D1 and D2 is hedged for 5 years. The hedged unit price is 
held at 2,511£/MW/yr for D1 and 1,028£/MW/yr for D2. By 
using (1), risk premium is calculated as 0.198% for D1 and 
0.056% for D2 respectively.   
Scenarios one: no network user comes or leaves 
This is a base case and assumed that no changes appear in 
the system except natural demand growth, i.e. no new 
customers come and no existing customers leave. The annual 
revenue that needs to be recovered is £85,532 from all 
customers. The revenue is proportionally allocated between 
EDCM and DCDCM customers according to their sizes. Thus, 
£23,327 should be recovered from EDCM customers and the 
remaining £62,205 is from CDCM customers. The projected 
unit tariffs are given in Table II.  
 
TABLE III TARIFF BILLS FOR FIVE YEARS IN SCENARIO ONE 
 Non hedged case (£) Hedged case (£) 
D1 64,123.57 64,146.67 
D2 52,510.77 52,489.99 
 
The final total tariffs over 5 years for D1 and D2 are given 
in Table III, which are the summation of yearly tariffs. 
Obviously, the tariff difference between hedge and no-hedge 
contracts is fairly small for both D1 (£23) and D2 (£21). Such 
small difference proves that if there is no risk or unexpected 
variations in tariffs, the designed long-term contracts can 
maintain the patterns of original tariffs. In this case, there is 
not need for customers to sign up long-term contracts but if 
they are willing to do so, they will see quite similar total tariffs.  
Scenario two: a new network user comes 
In this scenario, it is assumed that a new CDCM customer 
of 4MW comes to Bus 2 in the second year, leading to a group 
of 44MW CDCM customers.  
 
TABLE IV UNIT RESULTS FOR SCENARIO TWO (£/MW/YR) 
Pt Type Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
D1 
Charge 0.09 0.095 0.10 0.105 0.111 
Adder 2612.85 2190.04 2133.06 2073.56 2012.42 
Tariff 2612.94 2191.13 2133.16 2073.66 2012.53 
D2 
Charge 259.95 423.03 447.51 473.41 500.81 
Adder 766.27 635.85 619.03 601.76 584.02 
Tariff 1026.22 1058.89 1066.54 1075.17 1084.83 
 
Due to this change, the annual revenue split for both 
EDCM and CDCM customers change. As the total annual 
revenue is still £85,532, the EDCM port in the second year 
decreases to £21,760, which is calculated by 
£85,532×15.15MW/(15.15MW+44MW). While the split for 
CDCM customers increases to £63,722 (£85,532-£21,760). 
From the second year onwards, the revenue ports do not 
change because both EDCM and CDMC customers increase at 
the same rate of 1.0%. 
As given in Table IV, due to that there are no changes on 
Bus 1, its unit charges are the same as those in Table II. But, 
the new connectee has an immediate impact on D2’s unit 
charges, which have a sharp increase of £163 on the second 
year. It is because that the connectee causes both L2 and L3’s 
utilisation to increase, which thus brings forward the two 
circuits’ reinforcement horizons and consequently produces 
large charges. From the second year onwards, both D1 and D2 
have decreasing unit adders as there is more demand to share 
the revenue. The unit tariffs, however, decrease gradually for 
D1 but increase for D2. It is due to that the shrinking EDCM 
port produces smaller adders compared to the tiny increase in 
network charges.  For D2, the increasing unit tariffs are caused 
by the fact that the increase in network charges overtakes the 
decrease in site specific adders.  
    
TABLE V TARIFF BILLS FOR FIVE YEARS IN SCENARIO TWO 
 Non–hedged case (£) Hedged  case (£) 
D1  £56,163.83 £60,166.80 
D2  £54,203.01 £53,335.43 
 
Similarly, summing the yearly tariffs produces the final 
five-year tariff bills for the two customers, provided in Table 
V. Customer D1 sees high tariffs when he/she chooses the 
long-term contract, where the extra payment is approximately 
£4,000. The reason is that this customer’s risk premium is 
positive, which means that he/she needs to pay extra for 
transferring the risk although his/her actual unit tariffs are 
lower than the projected ones in Table II. On the contrary, D2 
has a drop in 5-year tariffs about £867.58. The reason is that 
the actual unit tariffs over the period are higher than the 
predicted ones in Table II. Although his/her risk premium is 
also positive, the savings in hedging overtakes the extra 
payment for risk premium.  
Scenario three: an existing network user leaves 
In this scenario, it is assumed that an existing 4 MW 
CDCM customer leaves Bus 2 in Year 2, leading to 36MW 
CDCM customers left. Due to this disconnection, the revenue 
split for EDCM customers increases to £25,137 and for 
CDCM customers decreases to £60,395 in the second year. 
For the next three years, the revenue split does not change due 
to the same reasons in the previous scenario.    
As given in Table VI, D1 has an increase in unit tariffs but 
D2 on the contrary has decreasing unit tariffs. It is because the 
disconnection of the 4 MW CDCM customer causes the 
revenue port for EDCM customers to increase from £23,327 to 
£25,137.  Therefore, D1 will see a tariff increase in the second 
year caused by the increase in site specific adders. From the 
second year onwards, the EDCM port keeps constant at 
£25,137. For the next three years, because both EDCM and 
CDCM customers increase at the same rate of 1.0%, there is 
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more demand in the system to share the revenue. Therefore, 
the unit tariffs monotonically decrease for D1. D2 sees 
decrease in network charges caused by decreasing network 
utilisation but increase in site specific adders caused by 
increasing revenue port in the second year. For the next three 
years, the decrease in adders overwhelms the increase in 
network charges, causing unit tariffs to monotonically 
decrease over the next three years.  
The final total costs in Table VII demonstrate that D1 can 
reduce the tariff risk by £3,572 and D2 also enjoys a tariff 
reduction, although the magnitude is only £47. 
 
TABLE VI  UNIT RESULTS FOR SCENARIO THREE (£/MW/YR) 
Pt Type  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
D1 
Charge 0.09 0.095 0.10 0.105 0.111 
Adder 2612.85 2906.74 2863.30 2819.45 2775.13 
Tariff 2,612.94 2,906.84 2,863.40 2,819.55 2,775.24 
D2 
Charge 259.95 172.56 182.53 193.07 204.23 
Adder 766.27 862.83 849.93 836.91 823.76 
Tariff 1,026.22 1,035.39 1,032.46 1,029.99 1,027.99 
 
TABLE VII TARIFF BILLS FOR FIVE YEARS IN SCENARIO THREE 
 Non-hedged case (£) Hedged case(£) 
D1 71,313.54 67,741.66 
D2 52,560.95 52,514.40 
B.  Contract Management for Network Users 
Scenario one: optimal hedged load percentage 
This section investigates how network users make 
decisions in selecting long-term contracts from a group of 
choices provided by network operators. The problem is to 
solve the discrete optimisation problem in Section V. Similar 
to previous three scenarios, the arbitrary hedged unit tariff P0 
is held at 2,511 £/MW/yr for D1 and 1,028 £/MW/yr for D2. It 
assumes that operators provide 11 discrete hedged load 
percentage options ranging from 0 to 100% gaped by 10%. 
 
TABLE VIII OPTIMAL HEDGED LOAD PERCENTAGES FOR D1 AND D2 
 
P0 
(£/MW/yr) 
Hedged load 
percentage  r 
Total tariff 
(£) 
D1 2,511 20% 64,107 
D2 1,028 60% 52,489 
 
Table VIII gives the final results, where it can be seen that 
the optimal hedged load percentages for D1 and D2 are 20% 
and 60% respectively. Under these values, they will have the 
least total network tariffs, £64,107 for D1 and £52,489 for D2.  
Figures 2 and 3 show the total tariff variance with different 
load hedge options for D1 and D2. In both figures, the X axis 
labels the 11 discrete hedge options from 0 to 100% and the Y 
axis labels the total tariffs. Obviously, the tariffs are very low 
for D1 when the hedged load percentage is small, which reach 
the minimum when the percentage is 20%. Beyond this point, 
the tariffs increase dramatically with hedged load percentage 
becoming large. The situation is opposite for D2. The tariffs 
are very high when hedged load percentage is small, but the 
values decrease gradually with the rise of hedged load 
percentage and reach to the minimum at a percentage of 60%.  
 
 
Fig 2 Total tariff for different hedged load percentage for D1 
 
Fig 3 Total tariff for different hedged load percentage for D2 
Scenario two: relationship of hedged unit price, hedged 
percentage and final tariffs 
It is obvious from (2) that hedged unit tariff price and 
hedged load percentage are two key elements affecting the 
final total tariffs. Here, more general analysis is conducted to 
examine the correlation between the two factors and the total 
final tariffs. For both D1 and D2, the linear discrete 
optimization in (4) was run to find at what combination of 
hedged load percentage and hedged price P0 the minimum 
tariff can be reached. The hedged load percentage r ranges 
from 0% to 100% and P0 varies from the minimum projected 
unit price to the maximum in Table II. In practice, P0 should 
be determined by the DNOs via risk benefit analysis 
procedures, which is out of the scope of this study. The 
depicted curves are shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively. 
In both figures, the X axis labels the hedged price P0 and 
the Y axis labels the hedged load percentage. The r with 
respect to P0 is calculated by solving the equation V’(r)=0. 
However, not all the values plotted in the two curves can 
minimize the optimisation objective function (4). After testing, 
only the values on the left hand side of the vertical red dash 
line and below the horizontal red dash line can minimize V(r), 
subject to 0≤r≤1. For the rest values of r, there are two distinct 
explanations. One is that r falls out of the range [0, 1], which 
will make the minimum of V(r) appear either when r=0 or r=1, 
since V(r) monotonically increases or decreases with respect 
to r in the range [0, 1]. The other is that r is between 0 and 1, 
but at this r, the value of P0 makes V(r) a concave function not 
a convex one. This will also make the minimum of V(r) appear 
either when r=0 or r=1. Neither situation makes sense for 
customers. Only the values of P0 that make V(r) a convex 
function and the minimum values of r locate within [0, 1] are 
meaningful to customers.   
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Fig 4 Relationship between P0 and r for D1  
 
 
Fig 5 Relationship between P0 and r for D2  
 
In the sections where the curves show that the tariffs have 
the minimum values, the two curves display quite different 
shape. For D1, when hedged unit price P0 increases, the total 
tariffs are minimised with the hedged load percentage r 
decreasing. By contrast, the combination of decreasing r and 
P0 produces minimum tariffs for D2.  
In summary, the appropriate settings of P0 in a long-term 
contract will give customers an option to select an optimal 
hedged load percentage as a trade-off between total costs and 
risk. Inappropriate hedged unit tariff P0 will push customers 
either not to choose long-term contracts or to be fully hedged. 
The proposed optimisation can assist customers to find the 
right balance between hedged percentage and hedged prices in 
order to minimise their total UoS tariffs. The benefits of 
choosing long-term contracts depend on the degree of the 
variation of the actual tariffs from the predicted values. 
VII.  DISCUSSION 
Many countries across the world have the similar charging 
structures like the UK for network users to use the networks, 
such as countries in Latin America [28]. The majority of the 
distribution UoS charges across the world are a flat rate for 
each voltage level, i.e. the same prices for the same networks 
without any locational differences. The UK and Brazil are the 
first to introduce locational differences in distribution use-of-
system tariffs. The key aim is to provide locational messages 
against the backdrop of substantial growth in Distributed 
Generation (DG), providing economic messages to guide their 
sittings that would incur the least network investment costs.  
This paper demonstrated that in achieving better economic 
efficiency, the locational charges introduce an undesirable side 
effect – price volatility. A mitigating solution is then proposed 
for the first time to hedge against the uncertain network tariffs. 
Hedging volatile network prices has to consider the interplay 
between the allowed revenue for the whole systems, the 
revenue pot split between EHV and HV/LV networks, the 
changes in revenue pots and network utilisations as customers 
migrate from HV/LV to EHV or vice versa. This provides 
valuable insights into the balance that academic research must 
strike - tradeoffs between cost-reflectivity, stability and 
simplicity. The proposed idea is not applicable to short-run 
marginal pricing schemes as they reflect short-run costs of 
energy, congestion and network losses, etc. These costs are 
not directly linked to network investment costs and not 
bounded by allowed revenue. Into the future, regulators would 
increasingly require network investment to be justified 
through reductions in operational costs rather than simply 
meeting peak demand, i.e. the trade-offs between investment 
and operational costs need to be balanced. Then, the proposed 
approach might be adapted to reflect the balance between 
short-run operational costs and long-run investment costs.   
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In order to reduce the risk in UoS tariffs for network users, 
this paper for the first time designs long-term contracts to 
mitigate the risk. It is based on hedging theory to fix the tariffs 
for part of load/generation over a period of time. Network 
users should pay for both hedged and non-hedged parts and 
also an extra part for the risk premium. The paper also 
develops an optimisation decision-making tool to assist 
network users to economically manage long-term contracts for 
minimising UoS tariffs. By analysing the demonstration 
examples, the following observations can be reached:   
i) UoS tariffs for network users have great variations 
caused by both external and internal elements, which 
could be detrimental to their business operation. It is 
essential for network users that the variations could be 
reduced to some extent by commercial means;   
ii) The designed long-term contracts can effectively 
reduce the tariff variation, the degree of which depends 
on hedged load/generation percentage, hedged prices, 
and the actual unit tariffs. When risk premium is 
positive, customers need to pay more for risk reduction, 
but when it is negative, customers can have a tariff 
reduction. The gain or loss by signing up the contracts 
is decided by the three key parameters; 
iii) The optimal contract management tool can assist 
network users to choose the most economic contracts, 
in terms of hedged load/generation percentage and 
hedged unit prices, to reduce their network tariffs. In 
some extreme cases, customers might not want to be 
hedged or want to be fully hedge as the minimum is 
achieved when the hedged percentage is 0 or 100%. 
Future work will incorporate customer risk aversion into 
hedge contracts and investigate the conditional value at risk 
for customers who choose differing contracts. Efforts will also 
be paid to study how regulatory frameworks should be 
improved in order to encourage both network operators and 
users to implement the long-term contracts. 
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